REBALANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH

Summary
In today's Information Society, one of the most salient paradoxes is the fact that the law of intellectual property has been systematically used in ways that erect barriers around the very building blocks that lie at its foundation. As intellectual property law stretches to cover all kinds of information-intensive goods at an atomic level, access to raw data and educational materials is hindered, creative inputs shrink and scientific research becomes harder, costlier and, in some cases, virtually impossible.
The set of limitations and exceptions offered by intellectual property laws around the world tends to be either too frail or too frailly implemented to combat intellectual property's organic malfunctions. The emergence of digital platforms and new forms of collaborative research and creation has not been matched by flexible, open-minded laws and regulations promoting innovation. This makes intellectual property one of the most unbalanced areas in Law.
Recent literature has suggested that one way of mitigating some of these problems would be to resort to human rights law as a framework when interpreting intellectual property norms.
However, although an increased dialectic relationship between these two fields seems desirable, the almost remedial quality of this proposal makes it somewhat limited in scope. Also, as technology changes quickly and new forms of production of intangible goods remain elusive to predict, summoning human rights provisions as a corrective measure to intellectual property's shortcomings might not be as illuminating as it has been in other legal areas. Nevertheless, reconsidering intellectual property norms in light of human rights' concerns might prove useful to recalibrate the already existing, albeit rather soft-safeguard mechanisms embedded in intellectual property law: in particular, it might serve as a guide for legislators and policy makers when considering new exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights, as well for courts when interpreting broadly drafted provisions.
It is impossible to have a sound public domain, which is the primary source of any kind of innovation, without a flexible intellectual property framework. Opening up intellectual property to multidisciplinary influences -among which human rights are likely to play an important role -is not only the key to fix its existing organic shortcomings, but also crucial for intellectual property to face (and finally fit in) the Information age.
Introduction
As developments in skill and technology brought down the marginal cost of copying, creators and related industries began worrying that non-rivalrousness and non-excludability 1 would soon lead to a scenario in which if anybody (and especially everybody) could easily appropriate the goods that they produced, then no one would have the incentives to spend time and money producing them 2 .Intellectual property was therefore designed as a balancing mechanism that would solve this particular kind of market failure: through the grant of monopolies (the copyright that will last the life of the author plus a few more decades 3 , the patent that will give lead time to inventor) it keeps alive the economic incentives that will lead to the production of public goods and therefore assures that the general public will be able to access the books and medicines that otherwise it may not have had. The catch is that when that period of exclusivity ends these goods will fall into the public domain, where anyone can use or re-use them for free 4 .
A different, less utilitarian approach, tells us that intellectual property is rooted in natural law and has its oldest coordinates in the labor theory of property 5 . Wendy Gordon summarizes
Locke's arguments in the following way:
"Labor is mine and when I appropriate objects from the common I join my labor to them. given work and it is in deference to this seed of one's personality that copyright law seeks to protect original expression. However, the fact that intellectual property deals with non-rivalrous and non-excludable goods poses some insurmountable problems to its assimilation into a strictly Lockean philosophy 8 . Human rights approaches to intellectual property that assume that the latter should be regarded as a human right qua property are fatally wounded because they rely on a defective analogy, confusing the tangible goods in which the intellectual work is embodied with the intangible goods themselves.
Regardless of which one of these approaches one may choose -and the truth is that legal systems are not aseptic ecosystems, so there has been a contamination both ways 9 -there is a balancing feature that is implicit in each one of them. An analysis of a possible dialectics between human rights and intellectual property must therefore have its essential focus on the current status of this balance and on the external disruptive effects that an ill-calibrated ratio between protected and unprotected elements will cause.
Despite its half-blood affiliation with natural law, it took a long time before intellectual property was first scrutinized through the lens of human rights. This does not mean that there At the same time that trade was becoming a magnetic force, intellectual property rights became stronger than ever before: for instance, the term of protection afforded by copyright law was extended in the United States 18 , Europe created sui generis rights over databases 19 , the scope of patentability kept stretching and stretching over time 20 . All these phenomena raise serious concerns that the balance inherent to intellectual property may have been destroyed and that anticommons effects 21 might be hindering future creation and innovation. And, in this regard, for the sake of some human rights -or some components of these rights -it is crucial to rethink intellectual property in light of its much needed balance.
What do we talk about when we talk about Intellectual Property and Human Rights
One can think about the connection between intellectual property and human rights in two different ways: intellectual property rights as human rights; or intellectual property and human rights as separate but overlapping areas. The first notion has direct roots in natural law and personalistic conceptions of intellectual property and it places the creator at the center of its system: civil law countries are called droit d'auteur countries, an expression that literally translates as "the rights of the author". Therefore, it is not surprising that the first time that
European courts examined the relationship between intellectual property and human rights, their main concern was to make intellectual property rights fit the concept of "property" as it appeared detached from a human rights framework. The emphasis is therefore on a static perspectivecopyrights, patents and trademarks as rights, and possibly as human rights -rather than on the dynamic interplay between intellectual property and the areas affected 23 by the grant of these exclusive rights (which, in many cases, are areas of incidence of classic human rights doctrine).
Common law countries, known as copyright countries, have built their intellectual property frameworks around the concepts of market failure and incentives to creation and innovation. The main difference between a droit d'auteur system and a copyright system is that the latter tends to recognize weaker moral rights, if any at all 24 . Because less emphasis is given to the centrality of the author or the inventor, the discussion is not centered on the possibility of copyright or patents qualifying as human rights per se; much of the critical thinking about the appropriate degree of patent and copyright protection and the recent trend of overprotection in both these fields 25 revolves around the detrimental effects that intellectual property rights have had on access to data or medicines, for instance, but they do so from an internal viewpoint -the viewpoint of intellectual property (in the United States, usually departing from an analysis of the 35 The lower court reasoned that only the Czech version of the beer name could be considered a designation of origin and Budweiser was its German form.
Budvar had already contested Anheuser-Busch's trademark when the latter filled its 1981 application and because of the bilateral agreement, which had been in effect for over two years when Anheuser-Busch challenged the geographical indication. In 2007, the Grand Chamber revised the Chamber's decision and held that Portugal had not violated article 1 and it also declared that it applies to both registered marks and trademark applications.
The meaning of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
The jurisprudence is Europe is now clear: intellectual property rights claims can find shelter under the European Convention on Human Rights. How far could a doctrine of intellectual property rights as human rights be pushed remains to be seen, but nonetheless it is worth pointing out that the reasoning followed by the Court departs from an erroneous construction of what intellectual property actually is. Protocol 1 of the ECHR talks about "peaceful enjoyment" of one's "possessions". This is language that is strange to the intellectual property field, and with good reason: the analogy between property stricto sensu and intangible property may be helpful to understand certain problems 36 , but it is certainly not accurate 37 .
Intellectual property rights were not created to promote "peaceful enjoyment" of works or inventions; they were created to promote their existence, which is to say that they confer to their holders precisely the ability to exclude others from enjoying the protected intangible good at all, if they so wish to do. This is not to say that the Court overstepped into an area which it was not supposed to reach: but it was more a clever and slightly twisted construction meant to encompass a field that 36 See supra, footnote 2. 37 See supre, footnote 1.
the drafters of the ECHR were not particularly concerned about, rather than a truly meaningful statement that intellectual property rights should be treated as human rights per se.
Interaction between Intellectual Property and Human Rights: the International Framework
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), states that:
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Although the UDHR is said to have no binding effect (given that it is a Recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly), many authors 38 point out that in fact possesses the force of international customary law. property regime must facilitate and promote cultural participation and scientific progress and do so in a manner that will broadly benefit members of society both on an individual and collective level 39 ". As we will see in the next section, it is highly doubtful that many of today's intellectual property policies are consistent with this proviso 40 . 39 See Audrey Chapman, Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right, in Copyright Bulletin, volume XXXV, no. 3, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001255/125505e.pdf, at 14. 40 See III. Likewise, the UDHR's call for everyone to be able to freely "participate in cultural life 53 "
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The TRIPS Agreement
and "share in scientific advancement 54 " should be understood with a grain of salt. The fact that it may be international customary law is certainly relevant in many other areas (areas that have always been at the core of human rights protection), but one should notice that the same article 27, at number 2, also mentions "the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author 55 " -and moral rights were expressly excluded by TRIPS in article 9. and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom." Berne article 6 bis.1 states that "Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation." Underlining added.
embraced a more utilitarian approach to intellectual property, i.e. copyright countries, would still join the Agreement.
It should also be mentioned that although a balancing approach to intellectual property in general is certainly welcome, there are also some disadvantages in this new trend. Indeed, there is some literature that suggests that bringing intellectual property rights too close to the human rights sphere would not result in a smoothening of intellectual property-generated imbalances, but in the rather twisted consequence of sharpening these asymmetries. As Peter Yu pointed out, "
[a]n emphasis of the human rights attributes in intellectual property rights is also likely to further strengthen intellectual property rights, especially in civil law countries where judges are more likely to uphold rights that are considered human rights. As a result, the development of a human rights framework for intellectual property would result in the undesirable "human rights" ratchet of intellectual property protection. 57 " Other potential problems would include "undesirable capture of the human rights forum by intellectual property rightsholders 58 " and "the framework's potential bias against non-Western cultures and traditional communities 59 ".
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to acknowledge that it might be perhaps too late to ignore that a significant part of the international community has embraced this quest for a socalled "human rights framework" to intellectual property. At the very least, this quest should lead us to look carefully into areas where intellectual property overprotectionism might lead to practical effects that endanger human rights: an unbalanced patent regime may directly affect the right to health, access to medicines or the right to food; an unbalanced copyright regime may impact freedom of speech, the right to education, cultural participation and to benefit from 57 scientific advancements. How can human rights theory help? By illuminating the debate about the appropriate levels of intellectual property protection, particularly when the field affected by the exclusive right is one of the mentioned above. The first step in any discussion over the possible interface between intellectual property and human rights should be to assess the impact that current intellectual property law and policy have on the core areas that they are supposed to balance and nurture, some of which are inherently at the core of human rights protection.
The language in article 7 of TRIPS, calling for the "promotion of technological innovation", the "transfer and dissemination of technology", alluding to the need of a "mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge" and highlighting that intellectual property rights should be set at a level that is "conducive to social and economic welfare" and to "a balance of rights and obligations", is a very good example of how human rights concerns can add a new layer to intellectual property legislation.
The recent debate surrounding intellectual property and human rights is therefore far more estimable if seen as the raising of a powerful red flag rather than the search for a unified theoretical human rights frame for intellectual property. The relationship between intellectual property and human rights is akin to the one of two distinct spheres or planets with different resources and different trajectories; one cannot be assimilated into another, but they are able to exert some effects on each other and it is this distant but continuous gravitational force that keeps each one of them on the right track. That is why it is important to keep monitoring intellectual property's routes, to prevent it from deviating from its original goals. Ultimately, the reason that should lead us to keep looking for more contact points between intellectual and human rights is exactly the same that lead to the emergence of the first intellectual property rules: the search for
